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JURISDICTION
Appellants file this reply brief pursuant to rule 24(c) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee's statement of the case and argument is inaccurate in the
following respects:
1.

Appellee's refer to fraud on the part of Appellants.

21, 23 and 24 of Appelle's brief.)

(Pages

In fact, the trial court specifically

ruled there was no fraud.
2.

Appellee's refer to a marshaling of the evidence. The issue

presented by Appellant is whether or not Appellee is bound by her own contradictory statements.
3.

An inspection performed by a duly licensed Utah State Safety

Inspector is presumed to be proper unless evidence is presented to the contrary.
4.

Appellee's brief incorrectly represents the testimony of David

T. Gray, an original defendant in this case but who was called as a witness
for Appellee and against whom Appellee did not take judgment.
ARGUMENT
1. On page 21 of her brief Appellee states:

"Plaintiff suffered

a loss by reason of Defendants' fraudulent failure to disclose the defective
and unsafe nature of the vehicle."
On page 23 of her brief Appellee states: . "The trial court declined
to enter an award of damages, but instead held that the suit was in the
nature of fraud and that the appropriate remedy was rescission."
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On page 24 of her brief Appellee states:

"Recission is an appropriate

remedy for fraud under Utah law.
In its ruling the trial court stated:
Now, in terms of remedy, I think this is not in the
nature of fraud
(emphasis added) (Ruling of the
Court Pg. 4, R 249)
In its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended
Judgment the court makes no finding of fraud.
It is inappropriate and misleading for the Appellee to discuss the
issues in this case as though there had been a finding of fraud.
2.

In her testimony regarding representations made to her by Appellant,

Appellee makes inconsistant statements. These are quoted in Appellants'
brief on pages 7,8 and 9.
In 30 Am. Jur. 2d at page 240 the general rule is stated as follows:
It has frequently been stated in broad general terms
that a party is bound or concluded by his own testimony
which is favorable to the adverse party
"
In Brooks v. Stewart (Mo. 1960), 335 SW2d 104, 81 A.L.P.2d 516, the
court stated:
When we say that a plaintiff is entitled to a favorable
view of the whole evidence we do not mean that material
facts testified to by plaintiff may be ignored. A
plaintiff is bound by his own testimony.
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co. (Utah 1942), 132 P.2d
388 at 392, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Ordinarily when a person contradicts his prior testimony
because it appears to be to his advantage to do so, the
veracity of such witness may become so questionable that
it may require strong and convincing corroborative evidence
to induce a court oi jury to believe his subsequent

2

declarations.
If there is substantial competent
evidence which is relevant and material, a finding of
the court will not be disturbed, although the court
might well have found otherwise.
In this case only two persons are fully aware of the communications
between them.

Plaintiff - Appellee should be bound by her statements

under oath which are favorable to defendant - Appellant.
3.

Defendant - Appellants1 brief cites the sworn testimony (Appellants

brief pgs. 10, 11, tr. 122, 123, 166, 167, 174, 182, 183) of both witnesses
for plaintiff and defendants that the subject automobile could not have
passed a Utah State Safety Inspection in the condition in which it was
found to be in May of 1989.
In April of 1989 (a year after the purchase of the subject automobile)
plaintiff had it inspected and it passed inspection.

(Exh. D-13)

No witness in any way contradicted the above-referred testimony or
attempted to attack the validity of Exh D-13.
An official act done pursuant to state authority is presumed to be
proper and valid.

Defendant was under no obligation to show the state

inspection was properly performed.

On the contrary, if there was a flaw

in the inspection, it was up to the plaintiff to demonstrate this to the
court.
In 30 Am. Jur. 2d at page 233, the general law is stated as follows:
It is often said that uncontradicted and unimpeached
evidence must be taken as true in the sense that it
cannot be arbitrarily disregarded or be disregarded
as against a mere suspicion of untruth or falsity.
With respect to presumptions, the Utah Supreme Court in Re Swan's
Estate, 293 P.2d 682, at 688, stated:
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Sane opinions in this court have held that the only
effect of a presumption is to place on the disflavored
party the burden of producing prima facie evidence to
the contrary and thereupon the presumption is eliminated,
and it is firmly established that such is the effect of
many presumptions. However, we have also recognized
that other presumptions are not so eliminated but have the
effect of placing on the disfavored party the burden of
pursuading the fact finder that the facts are contrary to
the presumed facts;
As stated above, plaintiff - Appellee had the subject vehicle inspected
in April of 1989, a year after she purchased it. It passed inspections.
All witnesses - both for plaintiff and defendant - testified that it could
not have passed inspection in the condition it was found to be in in May
of 1989.
4.

Plaintiff - Appellee refers to the testimony of David T. Gray

to jpstaripe the argument that defendant - Appellants had a right to believe
the subject automobile was in safe condition when it was sold to plaintiff.
As previously stated, David T. Gray was originally named by plaintiff
as a defendant in this matter. He subsequently became employed by Less
Jenson Collision Repair (plaintiff's witness), became a witness for plaintiff,
and plaintiff did not seek to tkae judgment against him.
Prior to becoming a witness for plaintiff, David T. Gray sent an answer
to plaintiff's complaint to plaintiff's attorney.

In that complaint David

T. Gray stated (in part):
I think Less Jensonfs Collision Repair has put false accusations in plaintiff's head. I also understand that the original
insurance bid on the vehicle had 3.0 labor hours on the
frame? repair, therefore the safety factor of this vehicle is
false, it had more cosmetic damage than structural damage.
I also believe that the right apron panel should have been
replaced and the right quarter panel, but on a vehicle with
a conventional frame, it didn't place any negligent danger to
plaintiff.
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So in conclusion, I ask, why was the car aligned if the
repair on the structure was negligent? (The car would not
be able to be aligned), (emphasis added) (Exh. D-31)
Plaintiff presented evidence that a principle reason the subject
automobile was unsafe was because it was of "unibody" construction. (Tr.
113-116, 118)
In his examination concerning why he had declared the subject vehicle
to be safe, David T. Gray testified:
Q. by Mr. Martineau:

When you wrote on this exhibit (Exh. 31):

I believed that the right apron panel should have been placed in the
right quarter panel, but on a vehicle with a conventional frame, it didn!t
place any negligent danger on the plaintiff
A.

I think at that time particular time that I wrote that, I thought

that car had a conventional frame under it, that it wasn't a unibody.
(Tr. 132)
Mr. David T. Gray was employed by defendants to repair the subject
vehicle.

(Tr. 125) He did the welding and repair thinking it had a con-

ventional frame.

It had a unibody. After it was repaired he thought it

was safe and didn't think differently until he discovered his mistake.
Any negligence attributable to repairing the subject vehicle as a conventional
construction rather than "unibody" is directly attributable to David T. Gray
and not the Appellants.
_ day of October, 1992.
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AMES L. BARKER""
Attorney for Appellants
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